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Abstract
We study the effect of foreign takeovers on firm organization. Using a compre-
hensive data set of Portuguese firms and workers spanning two decades, we find
that foreign acquisitions lead to: (1) an expansion in the scale of operations; (2) a
higher number of hierarchical layers; (3) increased span of control among top man-
agers; and (4) increased wage inequality across layers. These results accord with a
theory of knowledge-based hierarchies in which foreign takeovers improve manage-
ment practices and reduce communication costs within the acquired firms. Evidence
from auxiliary survey data provides support to this mechanism by suggesting that
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1 Introduction
Recent theories of knowledge-based hierarchies suggest that the decision of how to orga-
nize the acquisition, use, and communication of knowledge is central to understand issues
such as the evolution of wage inequality, the growth and productivity of firms, and the
gains from international trade (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015). Drawing on a com-
prehensive data set of French manufacturing firms, Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg
(2015) show that reorganization, through changes in hierarchical layers of workers, is key
to understand how firms expand and contract and the evolution of pay in each layer.1
While this evidence establishes the basic empirical credibility of organization-based
theories, relatively little is known about whether and how different economic or pol-
icy shocks can lead to firm reorganization and thereby impact labor market outcomes
(Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015). In this paper, we exploit comprehensive data on
Portuguese firms and their workers for the period 1991–2009 to study the effect of foreign
takeovers on firm organization and pay structure. The focus on Portugal is well-suited
for this purpose: following accession to the European Union in 1986, the country received
sizable inflows of foreign investment from higher-income nations, where firms tend to have
better management practices and make more extensive use of information technologies.2
Our empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. Following Caliendo, Monte and
Rossi-Hansberg (2015), we first divide the employees of each firm into hierarchical layers
using occupational categories. Focusing on firms that were domestically-owned in the
first year of observation, we then examine if and how foreign takeovers affect their inter-
nal organization and wage structure. An important challenge in identifying the effects of
foreign acquisitions is selection. If acquired firms are not representative of the universe
of firms that were initially domestic, subsequent heterogeneity in the evolution of firm
performance and organization across acquired and non-acquired firms might not be at-
tributable to the change in ownership (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Guadalupe, Kuzmina
and Thomas, 2012; Hijzen et al., 2013). To mitigate this threat to identification, we follow
the standard approach in this literature and examine the effects foreign acquisitions using
1In a recent related paper, Caliendo et al. (2015) find that Portuguese firms that reorganize and add
a management layer experience a 4% rise in quantity based productivity, while also observing a 4% drop
in revenue-based productivity.
2Leita˜o and Faustino (2008) report that between 1996 and 2005 the EU and the US accounted for
88.5% of foreign investment inflows in Portugal. The major investors in this period were the UK (16.4%),
Germany (13.3%), France (12.5%), the Netherlands (13.7%) and Spain (11.8%). Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen (2012, pp. 194) provide evidence that firms in several of these countries tend to have better
people-management practices than firms in Portugal.
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a difference-in-differences matching estimator.
We find that foreign acquisitions lead to: (1) an expansion in sales and employment
levels; (2) higher labor productivity; (3) a higher number of layers; (4) increased span of
control among top managers; and (5) increased wage inequality across layers. We find no
evidence that changes in wages following foreign takeovers are driven by changes in the
skill composition of the workforce within each layer.
These empirical results accord well with recent theories of knowledge-based hierarchies
(Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). In this frame-
work, the realization of output requires both labor and knowledge. More specifically, it
requires successful problem solving, which in turn requires sufficient knowledge. Agents
who do not know how to solve a problem, also do not know who else might be able to
solve it, leading to an optimal pyramidal organization structure consisting of a bottom
layer of production workers, and one or more successive layers of managers who specialize
in problem solving. Agents are rewarded according to their knowledge, and hence workers
in higher layers are rewarded with higher earnings. The number of layers is, all else equal,
determined by a trade-off between economizing on knowledge acquisition (increasing the
number of layers) and economizing on total communication costs within the organization
(reducing the number of layers).
Takeovers from investors from higher-income nations improve management practices
and reduce internal communication costs in the acquired firms. This leads to an increase
in the value of hierarchical organization and therefore to a rise in the optimal number
of layers. A reduction in communication costs also implies that the optimal distribution
of knowledge shifts upwards in the hierarchy, implying not only that more problems are
solved, but also that a larger share of problems are solved at the top of the organization—
thus leading to higher wage inequality between agents at the top and bottom of the hier-
archy. Finally, a reduction in internal communication costs following foreign acquisition
unambiguously leads to a higher span of control of top managers, while its effect on the
span of control of the other layers is a priori ambiguous.
While there is strong evidence in the literature that multinationals from higher-income
countries tend to have superior management practices and make more extensive use of
information technologies—and it is intuitive that these would lower communication costs
within acquired firms—we inspect for evidence on this mechanism by using an auxiliary
firm-level longitudinal survey. These data are available for a shorter period (2004-2009),
and contain information on utilization of information technologies that would be expected
to reduce internal communication costs, notably the intranet, the email, and internal net-
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works. Using a similar identification strategy, we provide evidence that foreign acquisition
has a positive and strongly significant effect on the use of the intranet. The point esti-
mates for the use of the other technologies are also positive, but imprecisely estimated.
We interpret this evidence as supportive of the precise mechanisms emphasized by the
theory of knowledge-based hierarchies.
In addition to contributing to the growing empirical literature on firm organization,
this paper complements and extends several other strands of existing research. A num-
ber of studies have provided evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to improvements
in residual-based measures of productivity, employment, wages, innovation, and man-
agement practices, including important contributions by Griffith (1999), Conyon et al.
(2002), Girma and Go¨rg (2007), Almeida (2007), Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Guadalupe,
Kuzmina and Thomas (2012), Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) and Hijzen et al.
(2013). While confirming that several of these outcomes also improve among Portuguese
firms following foreign acquisition, we believe that this paper is the first to establish a
causal link between foreign takeovers, internal communication, and the organization and
pay structure of firms. In doing so, this paper also adds to the literature on the labor
market consequences of new information technologies, including Autor, Katz and Kruger
(1998), Bresnaham, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Beaudry,
Doms and Lewis (2010) and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main data set used in the
analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and results related to the acquisition
decision. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy for examining the impacts of foreign
acquisition on the internal organization and pay structure of firms and reports the corre-
sponding results. Section 5 discusses if and how our empirical results can be rationalized
in the context of the theory of knowledge-based hierarchies. Section 6 provides additional
empirical evidence on the specific channel of causation identified by the theory. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper draws mainly on data from Quadros de Pessoal for
the years 1991 to 2009. This data set is an administrative census that gathers information
on firms and their workers for the corporate sector in Portugal. It is collected yearly by
the Ministry of Employment and participation is compulsory for every firm with wage
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earners.3 Each firm is required to provide information about its attributes and those
of each employee. The firm-level records include information on number of employees,
industry code, geographical location, and percentage of capital that is owned by foreign
investors. We assume that a firm is foreign-owned if more than 50% of capital is owned
by foreign investors.
The set of worker attributes includes monthly wages (base wage and other components
of pay), gender, schooling, date of starting, occupation, and hours worked. The employee
records may also be linked to those of the corresponding employer in each year. The
administrative records in Quadros de Pessoal are recognized for their high reliability and
are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking a firm’s compliance with labor law.
The records must be made available to every worker in a public place of the establishment,
which reduces the likelihood of misreporting.
Following Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), we group employees into four
hierarchical layers using detailed information on occupations: CEO and directors, top
managers, supervisors, and operators.4 We also compute measures of the span of control
for each layer, as well as firm-year and firm-layer-year averages of earnings, education
levels and other observable worker attributes.
We are interested in examining the effects of foreign acquisitions on firm organization
and pay structure. Hence we restrict our attention to firms that were domestically-owned
in the first year of observation, and focus on changes from domestic to foreign ownership
taking place within the same firm. Given our focus on internal organization, we exclude
from the analysis very small firms, i.e. those with less than 10 employees. With these
restrictions, we have data on 938 firms which were acquired by foreign investors during
the period of analysis. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how these acquisitions are distributed
over time and across industries, respectively. We see that there were a sizeable number of
acquisitions taking place in most years, but with a noticeable peak in 2002-2003. Foreign
acquisitions also took place in almost every industry, but with a quite uneven distribution.
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the full sample used in the estimation. Col-
umn (1) reports statistics on the universe of firms with more than 10 employees that
were initially domestically-owned. The other two columns distinguish between firms that
3Data for 2001 were not collected, and hence the analysis excludes this year.
4See Table A1 in the Appendix for a more detailed definition of each layer.
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remained domestic during the period of analysis (Column (2)) and firms that were eventu-
ally acquired by foreign investors (Column (3)). These statistics reveal that firms subject
to acquisition tend to be larger, more productive, pay higher average wages, and have a
larger number of layers. Notice that these differences reflect both initial heterogeneity in
firm attributes among acquired and non-acquired firms, as well as future changes.
[Table 1 here]
To examine the effects of foreign acquisition on internal communication we merged
Quadros de Pessoal with data from Inque´rito a Utilizac¸a˜o de Tecnologias de Informac¸a˜o
e da Comunicac¸a˜o nas Empresas, a firm-level survey conducted by the National Statistical
Institute that gathers information on the use of information technologies. Data from this
survey are available since 2004 and cover about 4000 firms per year. Interestingly for
our purposes, this survey collects information on whether the firm makes use of several
information technologies that would be expected to stimulate efficient communication
flows in the organization, notably the intranet, the e-mail, the extranet, and internal
networks. Since the two data sets do not contain the same unique firm identifiers, we
have matched firms using information on sales, location and industry code.5 We were
able to match information for 1054 firms with more than 10 employees, of which 107 were
acquired by foreign investors during the sample period.
3 The selection decision
Before turning to the analysis of the effects of foreign acquisition on firm organization
and wage structure, we explore the patterns of selection into acquisition. Evidence from
several previous studies suggests that foreign investors tend to ”cherry pick” the largest
and most productive firms in each industry. Below we inspect for evidence on the presence
of such selection in our estimation sample.
3.1 Estimation strategy
The likelihood that firm i in industry s is acquired by foreign investors in year t can be
estimated through a linear probability model of the form
Foreignit = βXit−1 + δs + φt + µit, (1)
5Information on sales, location and industry code is available from an intermediate data set, Sistema
de Contas Integradas das Empresas, a census of firms with the same unique firm identifiers.
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where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm is
foreign-owned and Xit−1 is a vector of lagged firm attributes (sales and labor productiv-
ity) that would be expected to influence the probability of acquisition in any given year
(conditional on the firm being domestically-owned one year before). We also estimate
models with industry-specific time trends to account for the role of idiosyncratic shocks
at the industry-level. In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the firm-level.
3.2 Results
Before turning to the regression analysis, we visually inspect for the presence of selection.
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of initial sales (top panel) and labor productivity (bottom
panel) for two groups of firms: (i) firms that were taken over by foreign investors during
the sample period; and (ii) firms that remained domestically-owned.6,7 To account for
potential differences in firm size and labor productivity across industries, these measures
are demeaned relative to the industry. Inspection of this figure reveals that the distribution
of each of these variables for acquired firms lies clearly to the right of those that remain
domestic, suggesting that foreign investors tend to target larger and more productive
firms within each industry.
[Figure 3 here]
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients from the linear probability model for the
acquisition decision, as defined in equation (1). The dependent variable is the dummy
variable for foreign ownership which is related to either lagged log sales or lagged log
labor productivity, each relative to the industry mean. All regressions include industry
and year dummies. The regressions in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) additionally include
industry trends that account for industry-specific idiosyncratic shocks.
[Table 2 here]
The results reported in this table provide evidence that larger or more productive
firms are more likely to become foreign-owned. The coefficient in column (2) suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in lagged log sales is associated with a 0.4 percent
higher yearly probability of being acquired. Rather than a continuous measure of sales,
6Our chosen definition of ”initial” is the year before takover for acquired firms and the first year of
observation for firms that always remain domestically owned.
7The densities are drawn using an Epanechnikov smoothing function with a bandwidth of 0.6.
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Columns (3) and (4) include indicator variables for each quartile of log sales. The point
estimates suggest that the probability of acquisition is significantly higher in the third
and fourth quartiles than in the first quartile. The results in Columns (5)-(8) point to
similar patterns of selection when using log labor productivity (and the corresponding
dummy indicators for quartiles), instead of log sales. In sum, the evidence presented in
this section suggest that larger and more productive firms are more likely to be acquired
by foreign investors. In other words, it suggests that foreign investors tend to ”cherry
pick” the larger and better performing domestic firms within each industry.
4 Effects of foreign ownership on internal organiza-
tion and pay structure
4.1 Estimation strategy
Our strategy for examining the effect of foreign takeovers on internal organization proceeds
in two steps. First, we adopt a difference-in-differences approach to compare changes over
time in performance and internal organization across acquired and non-acquired firms.
Specifically, we estimate an equation of the form
Yit = βForeignit−1 + γi + φt + µit, (2)
where i and t index firms and year, respectively; Yit is the variable of interest for firm i in
year t; Foreignjt−1 is the foreign ownership status of the firm in the previous year; γi is
a firm fixed effect; φt is a year effect; and µjt is the error term. We also estimate models
with industry-specific time trends to account for the role of idiosyncratic shocks at the
industry-level. In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the firm-level.
The firm fixed-effects account for the influence of all observable and unobservable
drivers of the acquisition decision that are constant or strongly persistent over time. If
heterogeneity in entrepreneurial capability (or productivity) across firms is fixed over time,
as in the Melitz (2003) model, this method accounts for the selection patterns documented
in the previous section. Hence we can compare the evolution of Yit at acquired firms with
that in firms that remain in domestic hands.
However, if firm capability evolves over the life cycle (see, e.g., Arkolakis, 2016), this
comparison may still be complicated by non-random selection. To address this issue,
we combine the difference-in-differences approach with propensity score matching (DD-
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PSM). The propensity score is the predicted probability of a firm being acquired by foreign
investors as a function of firm attributes observed one year before the treatment occurs.
We estimate a single model for the propensity score including all years and industries.
We use sales, productivity and wage as explanatory variables, in addition to industry
and year fixed-effects. We match treated firms by year and industry, using one-to-one
nearest-neighbor matching without replacement and imposing common support. By using
DD-PSM we essentially inspect for divergence in the path of Yit between acquired firms
and matched control firms that had similar observable attributes in the year prior to the
acquisition.
Table A2 in the Appendix reports results from several tests of matching quality. The
results reveal that our matching procedure succeeds in removing observable differences
between domestic and acquired firms. All individual t-tests and the two-group Hotelling
t-square test never reject the mean equality of observable attributes between domestic
and acquired firms in the matched sample. In addition, the very small magnitude of the
Pseudo R2 of the logit on the matched data, and the test of joint significance of regressors
given by the Chi-square test, confirm the overall quality of the matching procedure.
[Table 3 here]
Table 3 reports the results from estimation of the propensity score. We use a mul-
tivariate logit specification in which foreign acquisition is explained by lagged values of
sales, labor productivity and average labor earnings. The results confirm that foreign
investors tend to target larger firms. They also indicate that, conditional on size and
labor productivity, firms with higher labor earnings are more likely to be acquired. The
negative sign of the point estimate on labor productivity is likely caused by the fact that,
unlike in Table 2, the logit model includes simultaneously three different (but positively
correlated) observable attributes of firms.8
4.2 Results
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the sample of matched firms, i.e., firms that prior
to acquisition were similar among a number of key observable attributes. In comparison
with Table 2, domestic and acquired firms in the matched sample are clearly more similar
along the set of attributes measured. This would be expected since matching seeks to
8Although these variables tend to be positively correlated, they may well reflect relevant hetero-
geneity between acquired and non-acquired firms. To minimize these differences, we have include them
simultaneously in the logit model used for estimation of the propensity score.
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remove initial heterogeneity across firms along a number of observable attributes. Notice,
however, that some differences remain, as would also be expected if foreign acquisition
were to affect how these variables evolve over time.
[Table 4 here]
We proceed by examining the effects of foreign acquisitions on firm performance,
internal organization and pay structure. For each outcomes of interest, we report the
difference-in-differences estimates using the full and the matched sample, with and without
industry specific time trends. All regressions include year dummies. In line with results of
several studies reviewed above, the estimates reported in Panels A and B of Table 5 reveal
that foreign acquisitions lead to an expansion in the scale of operations, as measured by
sales and employment levels. We also observe that the point estimates remain fairly similar
when using either the full or the matched sample, and when including industry-specific
time trends. The effects on sales are larger then the effects on employment levels, and
hence labor productivity (measured as the ratio of sales to employment) clearly increases
following acquisition (Panel C). Finally, the results in the last panel reveal that average
worker earnings also rise.
[Table 5 here]
Our main interest is in whether foreign takeovers also affect the internal organization
and pay structure of firms. The results in Panel A of Table 6 reveal that acquired firms
tend to experience an increase in the number of hierarchical layers of employees. Once
again the difference-in-differences results are robust across different samples, and do not
depend on the inclusion of industry-specific time trends. In panels B to D, we examine
the extent to which foreign acquisitions also influence the span of control of each layer,
defined as the ratio between the number of employees in a given layer and the number
of employees in the layer immediately above (from an hierarchical perspective).9 The
results suggest that foreign acquisitions lead to an increase in the span of control of top
managers (Panel C). By contrast, the span of control of directors and supervisors remains
unaffected following the foreign takeovers (Panels B and C).
[Table 6 here]
9Since not all firms have all layers, the number of observations in each panel is reduced.
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We proceed by examining the effects of foreign takeover on the pay structure of firms.
The results in Table 5 suggest that average wages go up following acquisition. But this
leaves open the possibility that wages evolve differently across layers. In Table 7 we
examine whether this is the case. The results reveal that average wages tend to increase in
all layers following acquisition, but much more so in layers close to the top of the hierarchy.
In particular, the results in Panel A suggest that wages of CEOs and directors increase by
about 25% on average, significantly more than average earnings of top managers (which are
estimated to rise by about 10%), and those of supervisors and operators (which increase
only by about 3 to 4%). This evidence therefore suggests that foreign acquisitions tend
to lead to higher wage inequality between agents at the top and bottom of the hierarchy.
[Table 7 here]
A potential explanation for this finding is that foreign acquisitions lead to a change in
the skill composition of the workforce, which might then explain the observed changes in
wages. To examine this possibility, Table 8 examines the impacts of foreign acquisition
on the average schooling of workers in each layer. The results provide little support to
the hypothesis that changes in wages following acquisition reflect this channel. In partic-
ular, the point estimates for the matched sample (columns (3) and (4)) are statistically
insignificant and very close to zero.
[Table 8 here]
In Tables A3 to A5 (see Appendix), we examine whether foreign acquisitions lead
to changes in other worker attributes in each layer that would also be expected to be
positively associated with earnings, notably tenure in the firm and potential experience
the labor market.10 The results in these tables suggest that tenure and experience tend
to increase more at the bottom of the hierarchy following foreign takeovers. Since average
wages tend to be positively associated with tenure and experience, the fact that foreign-
owned firms tend to employ more experienced workers at the bottom of the hierarchy does
not seem to provide a plausible explanation for the observed increase in wage inequality
between agents at the top and bottom of the hierarchy following acquisition.
10The latter is defined as the difference between the worker’s age and the number of years of schooling.
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5 Discussion
How can our empirical results be rationalized? In this section we present a discussion of
our main results in the context of recently developed theories of knowledge hierarchies,
which allows us to identify potential mechanisms that could create a link between foreign
acquisitions and the internal organization and wage structure of firms. We start out by
giving a brief presentation of the main theoretical framework before suggesting a potential
mechanism that could explain our results.
5.1 A theory of knowledge hierarchies
The theory of firms as knowledge hierarchies has been developed by Garicano (2000) and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006), and further extended by Caliendo and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012). Here we will briefly present the main ingredients of the theory, as laid
out in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
The starting point is that production requires both labor and knowledge. More specif-
ically, the realization of output requires successful problem solving, which in turn requires
sufficient knowledge. This is modeled as agents (workers) drawing one problem per unit
of time, where output is one if the problem is solved and zero otherwise. However, some
problems occur more often than others. If we rank problems according to their likelihood
of occurring, problem z is characterized by a density function f (z) and a corresponding
cumulative distribution function F (z), where f ′ (z) < 0. A problem can be solved by an
agent who has enough knowledge. Assuming that knowledge is cumulative, i.e., knowl-
edge ẑ implies that all problems z ∈ [0, ẑ] can be solved, the proportion of all problems
an agent with knowledge ẑ can solve is given by q := F (ẑ). An agent that encounters
a problem that he does not know how to solve, can ask a more knowledgeable agent for
help in solving the problem. However, each time a problem is passed from one agent to
another, there is a communication cost of h < 1 units of time incurred.
A key assumption of the theory is that an agent who does not know how to solve a
problem also does not know who else might be able to solve it. Under this assumption,
the optimal organizational structure is a knowledge hierarchy consisting a bottom layer
of production workers and one or more successive layers of managers who specialize in
problem solving. The amount of knowledge increases as we move up in the hierarchical
structure. Thus, production workers learn to solve the most common problems, whereas
agents in higher layers in addition learn how to solve more exceptional problems. In each
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layer, unsolved problems are passed on to the next layer until the problem is solved or
until it reaches the top layer. Furthermore, the hierarchy has a pyramidal shape, where
higher layers become successively smaller. In equilibrium, agents are rewarded according
to their knowledge, which implies that wages are higher for agents working in higher layers
of the organization.11
When designing the optimal organizational structure, the firm has to decide on the
number and size of layers, and on the required knowledge of agents in each layer. Suppose
that a firm has L layers with n0 production workers (the number of agents in Layer 0)
with knowledge q0 and L− 1 layers of problem solvers (managers), where the knowledge
of managers in Layer i is qi. This implies that the number of problems passed on to
Layer 1 is n0 (1− q0). Since it takes h units of time to communicate each problem, the
number of managers in Layer 1 needed to deal with the problems passed on from Layer 0
is n1 = hn0 (1− q0). More generally, the size of Layer i is ni = hn0 (1− qi−1). Thus, it is
easy to see that q0 < q1 < ... < qL implies n0 > n1 > ... > nL.
The value of more layers is to economize on knowledge acquisition in the organization.
Since not all problems occur with the same frequency, it is more efficient that fewer
agents learn how to solve the more infrequent problems. By adding layers in a knowledge
hierarchy, the more knowledgeable problem solvers can be shielded from having to deal
with simple (and frequently occurring) problems and can concentrate on solving the harder
(and rarer) problems, which increases the value of acquiring knowledge. However, adding
more layers is not without costs, since there are communication costs each time a problem
is passed from one layer to another. Thus, the optimal organizational structure depends
crucially on the size of communication costs relative to the costs of acquiring knowledge.
5.2 Foreign acquisition and firm reorganization
How can foreign ownership affect optimal firm (re)organization in the context of the theory
presented above? Generally, the organization of the firm is determined by a number of
factors, such as product demand and technology, in addition to the costs of communication
and knowledge acquisition. A foreign acquisition might lead to an internal reorganization
of the firm insofar as it directly affects one of the factors that determine the optimal
organizational structure of the firm. Here we will focus on one potential mechanism that,
11These general characteristics of the optimal organizational structure are similar if agents are ex
ante identical, as in Garicano (2000) or Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), or if they are ex ante
heterogeneous, as in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). The optimal structure is also qualitatively
similar even if knowledge is not cumulative, as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
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according to the above presented theory, will lead to internal reorganizations that are in
line with our main empirical results.
One of the common explanations in the literature regarding the positive productivity
effects of foreign takeovers is that such a takeover also implies the transfer of new (and bet-
ter) management practices to the acquired firm (see, e.g., Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen,
2012). A key element of good management practice is to secure efficient communication
and information flows within the organization. Improvement in management practices
along this dimension will reduce the cost of communication, as measured by h in the the-
oretical model. Our empirical analysis has produced three robust results on the effects of
foreign ownership on internal organization and remuneration structure: (1) an increase in
the number of layers, (2) an increase in the span of control of managers in Layer 2 (”top
managers”), and (3) a strong increase in wage inequality across layers. These results are
all consistent with a reorganization caused by lower communication costs within the firm.
First, as explained above, the optimal number of layers is, all else equal, determined
by a trade-off between economizing on knowledge acquisition (increasing the number of
layers) and economizing on total communication costs within the organization (reducing
the number of layers). A reduction in the cost of communicating problems will increase
the value of hierarchical organization and therefore (weakly) increase the optimal number
of layers. In other words, since the cost of asking for help goes down, it is optimal to add
more layers of problem solvers.
Second, a reduction in communication costs also implies that it is optimal for produc-
tion workers (in Layer 0) to acquire less knowledge whereas more knowledge is acquired
at the top of the organization; in other words, the optimal distribution of knowledge shifts
upwards in the hierarchy (this is true even if the number of layers stay the same), implying
not only that more problems are solved, but also that a larger share of problems are solved
at the top (relative to the bottom) of the organization. This will, in turn, be reflected
in higher wage inequality between agents at the top and bottom of the hierarchy. Notice
here that, even though workers in the bottom of the organization acquire less knowledge,
their wages might nevertheless increase, since lower communication costs implies that a
larger share of problems will be solved, so that the expected value of production increases.
Thus, our finding of a positive (but modest) effect of foreign ownership on wages in Layer
0 is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the main effect of foreign takeover is a
reduction in internal communication costs. The only clear prediction from the theory is
that lower communication costs will lead to a higher wage inequality across layers, for
which we find strong evidence.
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Finally, for a given number of layers, the effect of lower communication costs on the
span of control in Layer i ≥ 1 is somewhat more ambiguous. Suppose that a firm has all
four layers, as defined in our empirical analysis (Layers 0, 1, 2 and 3). Denoting the span
of control in Layer i ≥ 1 by si, and using the other notation introduced above, the span
















= n0 (1− q1)h, (5)
where the number of agents in the top layer has been set equal to one (n3 = 1).
12 As
explained above, a reduction in communication costs (lower h) leads to lower knowledge
acquisition in Layer 0. When it is less costly for workers to ask for help, it is optimal
for them to acquire less knowledge to solve problems themselves (i.e., q0 decreases). Con-
versely, the optimal knowledge acquisition in Layer 3 goes up (i.e., q3 increases). Since
lower communication costs imply that the manager at the top of the organization can deal
with more problems, the value of acquiring knowledge to solve them increases. On the
other hand, since agents in Layers 1 and 2 both solve problems and ask help for problems
they cannot solve themselves, a reduction in communication costs has an ambiguous ef-
fect on their optimal knowledge acquisition. However, regardless of the sign of ∂q1/∂h, it
must surely be the case that ∂q0/∂h > ∂q1/∂h. Thus, as is evident from (3)-(5), the only
clear-cut relationship between h and si is in Layer 2, where lower communication costs
unambiguously lead to a higher span of control for the managers in this layer. For the
two other layers, the effect is a priori ambiguous. In Layer 1, managers have to deal with
more requests because of less problem solving in Layer 0 but, on the other hand, the cost
of dealing with such requests are also lower. The span of control in the top layer depends
entirely on the size of Layer 2, which in turn depends positively on communication costs
and negatively on the amount of knowledge in Layer 1.
12In our data, more than 50% of the firms in which Layer 3 exists have only one person in this layer.
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In sum, our discussion shows that, when interpreted in the context of the theory of
knowledge hierarchies presented above, our main empirical results are all as expected if
foreign ownership leads to lower internal communication costs. Although one should be
careful about applying the theoretical framework too literally to the real-world data, in
particular since there is only an approximate correspondence between the theoretical and
the empirical definition of a ”layer”, it is nevertheless interesting to observe that our
finding of a significantly positive relationship between foreign ownership and the span
of control among top managers (in Layer 2) is also consistent with the above described
mechanism.
6 Effects of foreign takeovers on use of information
technologies
In this section we exploit an auxiliary firm-level data set for the period 2004-2009 to
examine whether foreign acquisitions lead to the adoption of information technologies that
would be expected to improve the information flow within the organization, and thereby
reduce internal communication costs. As noted above, these data cover a smaller number
of firms and contain information on whether the firm makes use of several information
technologies that would be expected to stimulate efficient communication flows in the
organization, notably the intranet, the e-mail, and internal networks. It also contains
information on whether firms use the extranet, which might be expected to predominately
improve information flows between the firm and outside parties. Summary statistics for
these data are given in Table A6 in the Appendix.
[Table 9 here]
In order to examine whether foreign acquisitions influence the use of each of these
technologies, we adopt the identification strategy outlined in Section 4. The results in
Table 9 reveal that foreign acquisitions lead to a statistically significant increase in the
propensity to use the intranet. The point estimates for the other technologies are also
positive but imprecisely estimated. While the fact that this analysis is based on a smaller
and less representative sample recommends caution in drawing strong conclusions from
these results, it is interesting that they are well in line with the predictions of recent
theories of knowledge-based hierarchies. In particular, since the intranet is essentially
aimed at promoting more efficient communication flows inside organizations, the fact
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that its use tends to increases following foreign acquisition can be interpreted as direct
evidence for the precise mechanisms emphasized by this class of models, as explained and
discussed in Section 5.
7 Concluding Remarks
Recent theories of knowledge-based hierarchies suggest that reorganization, through changes
in hierarchical layers of employees, is key to understand how firms expand and contract
and the evolution of pay in each layer. While existing evidence lends strong support
to this class of models, relatively little is known about whether and how different eco-
nomic or policy shocks can lead to firm reorganization and thereby influence labor market
outcomes.
We exploited comprehensive data on Portuguese firms and their workers spanning the
period 1991 to 2009 to study the effect of foreign takeovers on the internal organization
and pay structure of firms. Our results provide evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to:
(1) an expansion in the scale of operations; (2) a higher number of hierarchical layers;
(3) increased span of control among top managers; and (4) increased wage inequality
across layers. These results accord with a theory of knowledge-based hierarchies in which
foreign takeovers improve management practices and reduce communication costs within
the acquired firms. Using an auxiliary survey data set, we provided evidence that foreign
acquisition has a positive and strongly significant effect on the use of the intranet. The
effects on the use of the other technologies are also positive, but imprecisely estimated.
We interpret this evidence as supportive of the precise mechanisms emphasized by the
theory of knowledge-based hierarchies.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Definition of hierarchical layers
Following Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), we use detailed information on
workers occupation to construct four hierarchical layers of employees. Table A1 presents
the definition of each layer.
[Table A1 here]
A.2. Propensity score matching




Tables A3-A5 show the effects of foreign ownership on worker attributes (within each
firm layer) such as tenure (Table A3), the share of newly hired workers (Table A4) and




A.4. Summary statistics, auxiliary survey data
Table A6 reports summary statistics on the auxiliary survey data for 2004-2009.
[Table A6 here]
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Figure 1: Distribution of acquired firms over time
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Log sales 14.0677 14.0411 15.5926
(1.3365) (1.3169) (1.5529)
Employment 42.1986 40.4140 144.7823
(143.0868) (128.6462) (485.1442)
Log labor productivity 10.8681 10.8561 11.5595
(1.0532) (1.0453) (1.2592)
Log average labor earnings 6.4841 6.4766 6.9117
(0.3731) (0.3668) (0.4748)
Number of layers 2.0508 2.0411 2.6098
(0.7620) (0.7572) (0.8227)
Total management (share of employment) 0.1625 0.1603 0.2894
(0.1907) (0.1882) (0.2711)
Directors (share of employment) 0.0039 0.0038 0.0067
(0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0244)
Top managers (share of employment) 0.0634 0.0636 0.0513
(0.0903) (0.0903) (0.0862)
Supervisors (share of employment) 0.0953 0.0959 0.2314
(0.1706) (0.1680) (0.2455)
Directors’ span of control (#top managers/#directors)* 2.9749 2.7904 4.8860
(6.5790) (5.8512) (11.5386)
Top managers’ span of control (#supervisors/#top managers)* 3.5481 3.4107 7.1851
(7.2593) (7.0160) (11.4416)
Supervisors’ span of control (#operators/#supervisors)* 11.4850 11.4926 11.2413
(20.0221) (19.5949) (30.7595)
Education (number of schooling years) 6.2147 6.1780 8.3235
(2.1079) (2.0792) (2.6149)
Tenure (number of years) 7.4826 7.4883 7.1516
(5.2359) (5.2356) (5.2389)
Workers with up to 1 year of tenure (share of employment) 0.1135 0.1133 0.1273
(0.1498) (0.1498) (0.1587)
Potential experience 25.8508 25.9121 22.3306
(6.5251) (6.5114) (6.3436)
N (obs.) 432,955 425,552 7,403
N (firms) 74,666 73,728 938
Table 1: Summary statistics, full sample
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for firms with more than 10 employees
over the period 1991-2009 (except 2001) that are not foreign owned in their first year in the sample. A firm is
foreign owned if foreign investors hold at least 50% of capital. Column (1) refers to all firms, column (2) refers to
firms that did not change ownership during the sample period, column (3) refers to firms that changed foreign
ownership status only once during the sample period. For variables marked with an asterisk, the number of
observations/firms varies as firms are not required to have all four layers. Monetary variables are in 2009 prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log sales 0.0029*** 0.0031***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
2nd quartile 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004)
3rd quartile   0.0017*** 0.0021**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
4th quartile       0.0061*** 0.0064***
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Log labor productivity 0.0021*** 0.0023***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
2nd quartile 0.0015***        0.0015**
(0.0005) (0.0005)
3rd quartile 0.0024***       0.0028***
(0.0006) (0.0007)
4th quartile 0.0041***        0.0048***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.772 0.773 0.772 0.773 0.772 0.773 0.772 0.773
F-stat                   11.480 7.762 10.718 7.429 11.305 7.664 10.682 7.381
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666
Dependent variable: foreign ownership
Table 2: The acquisition decision
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and *1% level. Log sales and log labor productivity
are relative to the industry mean and lagged one year relative to the dependent variable. 
Dependent variable: Foreign ownership
Log sales 0.5191***
(0.0392)
Log labor productivity -0.4915***
(0.0655)






Table 3: Propensity score estimates
Notes: All independent variables are lagged one year (prior to
acquisition). Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm-level.








Log sales 15.3816 15.1765 15.6631
(1.5823) (1.5450) (1.5898)
Employment 121.3401 93.1199 159.8928
(376.5269) (194.6533) (530.4888)
Log labor productivity 11.4403 11.3356 11.5844
(1.1599) (1.0677) (1.2618)
Log average labor earnings 6.8093 6.7447 6.8979
(0.4455) (0.4121) (0.4736)
Number of layers 2.5115 2.4387 2.6115
(0.8295) (0.8264) (0.8234)
Total management (share of employment) 0.2405 0.2110 0.2810
(0.2428) (0.2211) (0.2644)
Directors (share of employment) 0.0054 0.0050 0.0060
(0.0234) (0.0243) (0.0220)
Top managers (share of employment) 0.0482 0.0491 0.0469
(0.0746) (0.0747) (0.0743)
Supervisors (share of employment) 0.1869 0.1569 0.2282
(0.2208) (0.1994) (0.2411)
Directors’ span of control (#top managers/#directors)* 4.4016 3.4440 5.2639
(10.3146) (5.0909) (13.3206)
Top managers’ span of control (#supervisors/#top managers)* 6.1587 5.3019 7.1699
(9.0227) (7.8254) (10.1667)
Supervisors’ span of control (#operators/#supervisors)* 12.0196 12.4470 11.5018
(26.8166) (20.7892) (32.6559)
Education (number of schooling years) 7.4964 6.9800 8.2051
(2.5567) (2.4731) (2.4993)
Tenure (number of years) 9.2992 10.7991 7.2407
(5.7170) (5.6011) (5.2121)
Workers with up to 1 year of tenure (share of employment) 0.1009 0.0830 0.1254
(0.1332) (0.1135) (0.1560)
Potential experience 25.0404 26.9171 22.4648
(6.8019) (6.6342) (6.1560)
N (obs.) 11,964 6,821 5,143
N (firms) 1230 606 624
Table 4: Summary statistics, matched sample
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for firms with more than 10
employees over the period 1991-2009 (except 2001) that are not foreign owned in their first year in the
sample. A firm is foreign owned if foreign investors hold at least 50% of capital. Columns (1) and (3) refer
to firms that did not change ownership during the sample period. Columns (2) and (4) refer to firms that
changed foreign ownership status only once during the sample period. For variables marked with an
asterisk, the number of observations/firms varies as firms are not required to have all four layers. Monetary
variables are in 2009 prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: log sales
Foreign ownership  0.3752***   0.3771*** 0.3291***    0.3271***
(0.0452) (0.0452)   (0.0543)     (0.0546)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.858 0.858 0.806 0.806
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,691 74,691 1,230 1,230
B. Dependent variable: log employment
Foreign ownership 0.1346*** 0.1331*** 0.1391*** 0.1362***
(0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0304) (0.0301)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.908 0.908 0.904 0.905
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,691 74,691 1,230 1,230
C. Dependent variable: log labor productivity
Foreign ownership 0.2406*** 0.2440*** 0.1900*** 0.1910***
(0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0460) (0.0463)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.797 0.798 0.681 0.682
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,691 74,691 1,230 1,230
D. Dependent variable: log total earnings per employee
Foreign ownership 0.0613*** 0.0625*** 0.0435*** 0.0431***
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0111) (0.0109)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.826 0.826 0.849 0.850
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,691 74,691 1,230 1,230
Table 5: Effects of foreign acquisition on firm size
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard 
errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and *1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: number of layers
Foreign ownership 0.0981*** 0.1000*** 0.0849*** 0.0791***
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0311) (0.0308)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.676 0.676 0.655 0.656
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,691 74,691 1,230 1,230
B. Dependent variable: directors’ span of control (#top managers/#directors)
Foreign ownership 1.6455 1.6765 1.1357 1.3089
(1.6910) (1.6999) (2.0551) (2.1303)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.647 0.647 0.431 0.432
N (obs.) 10,452 10,452 1,180 1,180
N (firms) 4,508 4,508 347 347
C. Dependent variable: top managers’ span of control (#supervisors/#top managers)
Foreign ownership 2.9365*** 2.9311*** 2.3762** 2.3728**
(0.9058) (0.9065) (1.0279) (1.0305)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.708 0.708 0.527 0.530
N (obs.) 111,024 111,024 6,061 6,061
N (firms) 27,303 27,303 891 891
D. Dependent variable: supervisors’ span of control (#operators/#supervisors)
Foreign ownership -0.4781 -0.5367 -0.3345 -0.3946
(0.6657) (0.6642) (0.8060) (0.7940)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.743 0.744 0.781 0.782
N (obs.) 201,368 201,368 9,135 9,135
N (firms) 41,235 41,235 1,082 1,082
Table 6: Effects of foreign acquisition on internal organization
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the firm-level. *10% level, **5% level, and *1%
level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: log average directors’ earnings
Foreign ownership 0.2638** 0.2639** 0.2662* 0.2526* 
(0.1283) (0.1283) (0.1362) (0.1335)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.890 0.891 0.776 0.789
N (obs.) 13,016 13,016 1,332 1,332
N (firms) 5,544 5,544 401 401
B. Dependent variable: log average top managers’ earnings
Foreign ownership 0.1401*** 0.1407*** 0.0946*** 0.0937***
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0334) (0.0331)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.815 0.815 0.686 0.688
N (obs.) 95,027 95,027 5,641 5,641
N (firms) 26,554 26,554 881 881
C. Dependent variable: log average supervisors’ earnings
Foreign ownership 0.0446*** 0.0456*** 0.0372* 0.0362* 
(0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0193) (0.0191)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.730 0.731 0.672 0.673
N (obs.) 196,750 196,750 9,050 9,050
N (firms) 40,407 40,407 1,076 1,076
D. Dependent variable: log average operators’ earnings
Foreign ownership 0.0427*** 0.0438*** 0.0319*** 0.0314***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0108) (0.0107)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.780 0.780 0.784 0.785
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 1,230 1,230
Table 7: Effects of foreign acquisition on pay structure
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year 
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, 
**5% level, and *1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: log average directors’ education
Foreign ownership -0.0651*** -0.0632*** -0.0008 -0.0008
(0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0210) (0.0210)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.948 0.948 0.902 0.906
N (obs.) 22,049 22,049 1,633 1,633
N (firms) 10,423 10,423 495 495
B. Dependent variable: log average top managers’ education
Foreign ownership 0.0151 0.0146 0.019 0.0192
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0146) (0.0147)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.905 0.905 0.829 0.829
N (obs.) 231,512 231,512 7,304 7,304
N (firms) 50,762 50,762 1,022 1,022
C. Dependent variable: log average supervisors’ education
Foreign ownership 0.0062 0.0062 0.0068 0.0071
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0166) (0.0165)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.770 0.770 0.660 0.661
N (obs.) 201,277 201,277 9,134 9,134
N (firms) 41,203 41,203 1,082 1,082
D. Dependent variable: log average operators’ education
Foreign ownership 0.0035 0.0041 -0.0075 -0.0059
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0081) (0.0080)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.852 0.852 0.872 0.873
N (obs.) 432,780 432,780 11,962 11,962
N (firms) 74,646 74,646 1,230 1,230
Table 8: Effects of foreign acquisition on average education
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5%
level, and *1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: use of intranet
Foreign ownership 0.2231*** 0.2543*** 0.2996*** 0.3693***
(0.0758) (0.0767) (0.0919) (0.0988)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.699 0.703 0.728 0.741
N (obs.) 2,870 2,870 133 133
N (firms) 1,054 1,054 33 33
B. Dependent variable: use of email
Foreign ownership 0.0121 0.0239 0.0750 0.0735
(0.0705) (0.0751) (0.0826) (0.0938)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.894 0.894 0.852 0.860
N (obs.) 2,870 2,870 133 133
N (firms) 1,054 1,054 33 33
C. Dependent variable: use of extranet
Foreign ownership 0.0582 0.0536 0.0147 0.0508
(0.1145) (0.1170) (0.1253) (0.1301)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.626 0.627 0.642 0.647
N (obs.) 2,870 2,870 133 133
N (firms) 1,054 1,054 33 33
D. Dependent variable: use of internal networks
Foreign ownership 0.0149 0.0145 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0137) (0.0136) (n.d.) (0.0002)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.932 0.932 1.000 1.000
N (obs.) 2,870 2,870 133 133
N (firms) 1,054 1,054 33 33
Table 9: Effects of foreign acquisition on the use of information technologies
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors
in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and *1% level.
Occupations Correspondence in CNP94
Layer 3: CEO and Directors ”General directors” and ”directors and managers of small firms” 121; 131
Layer 2: Top managers ”Directors of production, finance or other” 122, 123
Layer 1: Supervisors
”Specialists in scientific and intellectual jobs”; ”Intermediate-level 
technicians and professionals”
between 200 & 400
Layer 0: Operators
”Administrative staff”; ”Service and sales staff”; ”Workers and 
craft”; ”Machine operators”;”Unskilled workers”
above 400
Table A1: Definition of layers
Notes: Table displays definition of occupations included in each layer using the 1994 National Classification of Occupations
(CNP94) 
Panel A: t-test before and after matching
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % reduct bias t-test p-value
Log sales Unmatched 15.111 13.981 71.900 20.690 0.000
Matched 15.111 15.213 -6.400 91 -1.080 0.281
Log labor productivity Unmatched 11.322 10.798 41.200 11.930 0.000
Matched 11.322 11.352 -2.300 94 -0.410 0.685
Log monthly labor earnings Unmatched 6.856 6.453 93.700 27.210 0.000
Matched 6.856 6.835 4.900 95 0.790 0.430
Food, beverage, tobacco Unmatched 0.034 0.048 -7.000 -1.630 0.104
Matched 0.034 0.034 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Textiles, leather Unmatched 0.080 0.125 -14.800 -3.380 0.001
Matched 0.080 0.080 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Wood, cork, paper Unmatched 0.034 0.049 -7.600 -1.750 0.081
Matched 0.034 0.034 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Non-metallic manufacturing Unmatched 0.101 0.049 19.800 6.000 0.000
Matched 0.101 0.101 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Metallic manufacturing Unmatched 0.123 0.083 13.100 3.610 0.000
Matched 0.123 0.123 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Furniture Unmatched 0.011 0.028 -12.100 -2.540 0.011
Matched 0.011 0.011 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Construction Unmatched 0.051 0.129 -27.200 -5.760 0.000
Matched 0.051 0.051 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Wholesale and retail trade Unmatched 0.309 0.240 15.500 4.030 0.000
Matched 0.309 0.309 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Hotels and restaurants Unmatched 0.030 0.073 -19.400 -4.100 0.000
Matched 0.030 0.030 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Transport, storage, other Unmatched 0.061 0.035 11.900 3.440 0.001
Matched 0.061 0.061 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Post, telecommunications Unmatched 0.005 0.001 8.000 4.030 0.000
Matched 0.005 0.005 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Financial intermediation Unmatched 0.016 0.007 8.900 2.890 0.004
Matched 0.016 0.016 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Real estate, renting, business Unmatched 0.115 0.076 13.300 3.680 0.000
Matched 0.115 0.115 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Education Unmatched 0.003 0.015 -12.700 -2.460 0.014
Matched 0.003 0.003 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Health, social work Unmatched 0.006 0.021 -12.700 -2.570 0.010
Matched 0.006 0.006 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Other social activities Unmatched 0.010 0.013 -3.000 -0.700 0.483
Matched 0.010 0.010 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1991 Unmatched 0.101 0.050 19.500 5.860 0.000
Matched 0.101 0.101 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1992 Unmatched 0.074 0.051 9.600 2.630 0.009
Matched 0.074 0.074 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1993 Unmatched 0.042 0.048 -3.000 -0.730 0.468
Matched 0.042 0.042 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1994 Unmatched 0.045 0.051 -2.900 -0.700 0.483
Matched 0.045 0.045 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1996 Unmatched 0.022 0.050 -15.000 -3.190 0.001
Matched 0.022 0.022 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1997 Unmatched 0.046 0.052 -2.400 -0.590 0.555
Matched 0.046 0.046 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Table A2:  Indicators of the covariate balancing before and after matching
Mean
Panel A: t-test before and after matching (cont.)
%reduct
Sample Treated Control %bias bias t-test p-value
1998 Unmatched 0.019 0.053 -18.400 -3.800 0.000
Matched 0.019 0.019 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1999 Unmatched 0.037 0.056 -9.100 -2.080 0.037
Matched 0.037 0.037 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2000 Unmatched 0.038 0.062 -10.800 -2.430 0.015
Matched 0.038 0.038 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2002 Unmatched 0.183 0.069 34.600 11.110 0.000
Matched 0.183 0.183 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2003 Unmatched 0.083 0.071 4.500 1.170 0.243
Matched 0.083 0.083 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2004 Unmatched 0.035 0.075 -17.400 -3.750 0.000
Matched 0.035 0.035 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2005 Unmatched 0.053 0.076 -9.600 -2.210 0.027
Matched 0.053 0.053 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2007 Unmatched 0.095 0.078 5.900 1.540 0.124
Matched 0.095 0.095 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2008 Unmatched 0.061 0.080 -7.300 -1.720 0.086
Matched 0.061 0.061 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Two-group Hotelling T-squared test
Sample T-squared F-test p-value
Matched 3.232 0.093 1.000
Panel C: Pseudo R2 and test of joint sifnificance of regressors
Sample Pseudo R2 Chi2 p-value
Unmatched 0.120 -4131 0.000
Matched 0.002 -863 1.000
Table A2:  Indicators of the covariate balancing before and after matching (cont.)
Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: log average directors’ tenure
Foreign ownership 0.1494 0.1495 0.0445 0.0402
(0.1305) (0.1309) (0.1333) (0.1343)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.8545 0.8551 0.7792 0.7827
N (obs.) 21,118 21,118 1,554 1,554
N (firms) 10,120 10,120 481 481
B. Dependent variable: log average top managers’ tenure
Foreign ownership 0.0199 0.0229 0.1370*** 0.1391***
(0.0463) (0.0462) (0.0487) (0.0487)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.794 0.794 0.665 0.667
N (obs.) 227,364 227,364 7,148 7,148
N (firms) 50,027 50,027 1,009 1,009
C. Dependent variable: log average supervisors’ tenure
Foreign ownership 0.1138*** 0.1154*** 0.1829*** 0.1772***
(0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0397) (0.0398)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.751 0.751 0.703 0.705
N (obs.) 192,066 192,066 8,981 8,981
N (firms) 39,654 39,654 1,071 1,071
D. Dependent variable: log average operators’ tenure
Foreign ownership 0.1376*** 0.1409*** 0.2579*** 0.2559***
(0.0255) (0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0268)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.858 0.858 0.831 0.831
N (obs.) 431,492 431,492 11,939 11,939
N (firms) 74,482 74,482 1,230 1,230
Table A3: Effects of foreign acquisition on average tenure
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5%
level, and *1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: share of directors with tenure up to 1 year
Foreign ownership -0.0174 -0.0186 0.0064 0.0093
(0.0395) (0.0396) (0.0410) (0.0415)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.548 0.549 0.408 0.416
N (obs.) 22,051 22,051 1,633 1,633
N (firms) 10,425 10,425 495 495
B. Dependent variable: share of top managers with tenure up to 1 year
Foreign ownership 0.0001 0.0003 0.0091 0.0096
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0110) (0.0110)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.388 0.388 0.283 0.286
N (obs.) 231,535 231,535 7,304 7,304
N (firms) 50,771 50,771 1,022 1,022
C. Dependent variable: share of supervisors with tenure up to 1 year
Foreign ownership -0.0077 -0.0088 -0.0241*** -0.0233***
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0088)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.401 0.402 0.349 0.351
N (obs.) 201,368 201,368 9,135 9,135
N (firms) 41,235 41,235 1,082 1,082
D. Dependent variable: share of operators with tenure up to 1 year
Foreign ownership -0.0276*** -0.0283*** -0.0361*** -0.0356***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0064)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.542 0.542 0.488 0.489
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 1,230 1,230
Table A4: Effects of foreign acquisition on the share of newcomers
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and *1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: log average directors’ experience
Foreign ownership 0.0386 0.0354 0.0167 0.0284
(0.0558) (0.0561) (0.0587) (0.0593)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.853 0.853 0.782 0.790
N (obs.) 22,049 22,049 1,633 1,633
N (firms) 10,425 10,425 495 495
B. Dependent variable: log average top managers’ experience
Foreign ownership 0.0103 0.0109 0.0117 0.013
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.775 0.775 0.662 0.663
N (obs.) 231,531 231,531 7,303 7,303
N (firms) 50,770 50,770 1,022 1,022
C. Dependent variable: log average supervisors’ experience
Foreign ownership 0.0291 0.0299 0.0295 0.0289
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0231) (0.0229)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.722 0.723 0.636 0.638
N (obs.) 201,349 201,349 9,135 9,135
N (firms) 41,232 41,232 1,082 1,082
D. Dependent variable: log average operators’ experience
Foreign ownership 0.0350*** 0.0346*** 0.0482*** 0.0472***
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0105) (0.0104)
Industry trends N Y N Y
Matched sample N N Y Y
R2 0.8101 0.8102 0.8124 0.8132
N (obs.) 432,946 432,946 11,964 11,964
N (firms) 74,445 74,445 1,230 1,230
Table A5: Effects of foreign acquisition on average experience
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Use of intranet (yes=1) 0.2885 0.2803 0.3488 0.3066 0.3030 0.3099
(0.4531) (0.4492) (0.4773) (0.4628) (0.4633) (0.4657)
Use of e-mail (yes=1) 0.4108 0.4113 0.4070 0.4234 0.4545 0.3944
(0.4921) (0.4922) (0.4920) (0.4960) (0.5020) (0.4922)
Use of extranet (yes=1) 0.1679 0.1607 0.2209 0.2117 0.1818 0.2394
(0.3739) (0.3674) (0.4155) (0.4100) (0.3888) (0.4298)
Use of internal networks (yes=1) 0.3226 0.3199 0.3430 0.3431 0.3333 0.3521
(0.4676) (0.4665) (0.4754) (0.4765) (0.4753) (0.4810)
Log sales 17.0979 17.0466 17.4743 17.8790 18.1133 17.6611
(1.3605) (1.3580) (1.3210) (1.4685) (1.1148) (1.7136)
Employment 387.9286 355.7696 624.0727 420.3869 417.8636 422.7324
(764.4519) (601.5651) (1469.8740) (392.6394) (323.7705) (449.6676)
Log labor productivity 11.8582 11.8373 12.0118 12.2915  12.46804  12.1274
(1.4559) (1.4522) (1.4765) (1.5010) (1.0713) (1.8041)
Log average labor earnings 6.8362 6.8092 7.0342 7.0515 7.0128 7.0874
(0.4395) (0.4234) (0.5013) (0.3404) (0.2765) (0.3891)
N (obs.) 2,870 2,526 344 133 62 71
N (firms) 1,054 947 107 33 16 17
Table A6: Summary statistics, auxiliary survey data
Full sample Matched sample
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for firms with more than 10 employees over
the period 2004-2009 that are not foreign owned in their first year in the sample. A firm is foreign owned if foreign
investors hold at least 50% of capital. Columns (1) and (4) refer to all firms, column (2) and (5), refer to firms that did
not change ownership during the sample period, columns (3) and (6) refer to firms that changed to foreign ownership
status only once during the sample period. Monetary variables are in 2009 prices.
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